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Abstract: We suggest that certain experiences reported by patients with
schizophrenia show that priority, consistency, and exclusivity are not suffi-
cient for the experience of willing an action. Furthermore, we argue that
even if priority, consistency, and exclusivity cause the experience of being
the author of an action, this does not mean that conscious will is an illu-
sion.
Wegner  (2002)  discusses  an  impressive  variety  of  phenomena
demonstrating that when the three conditions, priority, consis-
tency, and exclusivity are met, an action feels willed, whereas
when one or more do not apply, the cause of an action is attrib-
uted to forces other than the self. He convincingly shows that the
feeling of conscious will can be erroneous, such that a person can
either believe he was the author of an action even though he was
not, or that he can believe he was not the author while in actual
fact he was. The strongest version of Wegner’s claim would be that
priority, consistency, and exclusivity are both necessary and suffi-
cient for the experience of willing an action. However, we suggest
that certain experiences reported by patients with schizophrenia
show that priority, consistency, and exclusivity are not sufficient
for the experience of willing an action.
Patients with delusions of control report that their actions, even
quite trivial actions, are being controlled, not by themselves, but by
some alien force. Patients report such abnormal experiences even
though they have the prior intention to make the action, the action
made is consistent with their intention, and there is no obvious am-
biguity about who is making the action. We have suggested else-
where (Hohwy & Frith 2004) that what is missing is an aspect of
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ing what is going to happen and, at the same time, minimal aware-
ness of the sensory consequences. Thus, will has a specific phe-
nomenology in addition to the knowledge of authorship.
We also propose that, even if priority, consistency, and exclu-
sivity are sufficient for the experience of being the author of an ac-
tion, this does not mean that conscious will is an illusion. The sit-
uations Wegner draws upon to claim that conscious will is simply
an emotion of authorship are all very specific and differ in impor-
tant ways from everyday settings. First, they are characterized by
a lack of exclusivity, such that the intention to perform an action
can either be attributed to oneself or another entity, be it a hyp-
notist, a ghost, or simply another person. Faced with a lack of ex-
clusivity, we are likely to attribute authorship of an action to some-
body else – unless priority and consistency are reinforced as in the
“I Spy” study, wherein people are tricked into attributing to them-
selves an intention they never had. In everyday life, most of our
actions and intentions can usually unambiguously be attributed to
ourselves. Second, Wegner focuses on situations where intentions
in action rather than prior intentions (Searle 1983) are at stake. He
investigates the feeling of authorship in situations where one did
not have a strong prior intention to perform a specific action.
However, in everyday life, many of our actions seem to be the con-
sequence of prior intentions that have been formed following con-
scious deliberation. A recent experiment (Lackner et al., in prepa-
ration) suggests that when a prior intention for an action has been
formed, performance of the action is less susceptible to the influ-
ence of a distracter (a voice referring either to the action to be per-
formed or an action not to be performed) than when the action is
only accompanied by an intention in action. It seems that Wegner,
in his remarkable study of the phenomenal will, has extended his
conclusions slightly too far to include all kinds of intentions, and
while his thought-provoking ideas explain cases of intentions in ac-
tion, they do not explain prior intentions very well.
Finally, we suggest that from the finding that the phenomenal
will can be illusory it does not follow that the empirical will, de-
fined as “the causality of the person’s conscious thoughts as estab-
lished by a scientific analysis of their covariation with the person’s
behavior” (Wegner 2002, p. 14) is also an illusion. Although Weg-
ner claims to address only the phenomenal will, he uses demon-
strations of how the feeling of conscious will can be erroneous at
times to draw conclusions about the empirical will, suggesting that
all or most of our voluntary actions are caused by unconscious
forces rather than conscious intentions. From the observation that
the feeling of conscious will and actions are not causally related in
certain specific conditions such as hypnosis, automatisms, and
particular experimental settings, it does not automatically follow
that conscious thoughts are generally not causally related to ac-
tions.
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Abstract: This book is a tour de force in showing that what we believe to
be actions dictated by conscious will are not, in fact, wholly dictated by
conscious will. However, Wegner has fallen into the trap of making claims
that go beyond his data to make his case more compelling and newswor-
thy. Psychology needs to be informed by common sense.
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